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Background. Individuals with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) have profound impairments in the interpersonal social
domain, but it is unclear if individuals with ASC also have impairments in the intrapersonal self-referential domain. We aimed
to evaluate across several well validated measures in both domains, whether both self-referential cognition and empathy are
impaired in ASC and whether these two domains are related to each other. Methodology/Principal Findings. Thirty adults
aged 19-45, with Asperger Syndrome or high-functioning autism and 30 age, sex, and IQ matched controls participated in the
self-reference effect (SRE) paradigm. In the SRE paradigm, participants judged adjectives in relation to the self, a similar close
other, a dissimilar non-close other, or for linguistic content. Recognition memory was later tested. After the SRE paradigm,
several other complimentary self-referential cognitive measures were taken. Alexithymia and private self-consciousness were
measured via self-report. Self-focused attention was measured on the Self-Focus Sentence Completion task. Empathy was
measured with 3 self-report instruments and 1 performance measure of mentalizing (Eyes test). Self-reported autistic traits
were also measured with the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Although individuals with ASC showed a significant SRE in
memory, this bias was decreased compared to controls. Individuals with ASC also showed reduced memory for the self and
a similar close other and also had concurrent impairments on measures of alexithymia, self-focused attention, and on all 4
empathy measures. Individual differences in self-referential cognition predicted mentalizing ability and self-reported autistic
traits. More alexithymia and less self memory was predictive of larger mentalizing impairments and AQ scores regardless of
diagnosis. In ASC, more self-focused attention is associated with better mentalizing ability and lower AQ scores, while in
controls, more self-focused attention is associated with decreased mentalizing ability and higher AQ scores. Increasing private
self-consciousness also predicted better mentalizing ability, but only for individuals with ASC. Conclusions/Significance. We
conclude that individuals with ASC have broad impairments in both self-referential cognition and empathy. These two
domains are also intrinsically linked and support predictions made by simulation theory. Our results also highlight a specific
dysfunction in ASC within cortical midlines structures of the brain such as the medial prefrontal cortex.
Citation: Lombardo MV, Barnes JL, Wheelwright SJ, Baron-Cohen S (2007) Self-Referential Cognition and Empathy in Autism. PLoS ONE 2(9): e883.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883
INTRODUCTION
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) involve impairments in social
functioning, language or communication, and the presence of
stereotyped repetitive behaviors and/or highly restricted interests.
Historically, the ‘‘self’’ has been integral in what it means to have
autism. The term ‘‘autism’’ (derived from the Greek word ‘‘autos’’,
which literally means ‘‘self’’) was first coined by Bleuler to
characterize many of the social withdrawal symptoms exhibited by
schizophrenics. Later, Kanner[1] applied this term to the children
in his clinic whom he observed to be completely self-focused. Most
recently, Frith[2] has developed a theoretical perspective that puts
the self at the core of all the observed impairments and strengths in
ASC. Frith’s theory differs from Kanner in that, instead of viewing
ASC as a syndrome of complete self-focus, it is viewed under the
notion of an ‘‘absent self’’.
The first reason for proposing an absent self comes from several
observations that detail abnormalities in ASC due to weak central
coherence[3], executive dysfunction[4], and varying degrees of
mindblindness[5]. One commonality among all of these theories is
a lack of what psychologists have historically called the ‘‘central
executive’’; that is, a lack of top-down control of bottom-up
information processing in the brain[2]. Recent neuroimaging
studies have confirmed that all of these abnormalities are due to
deficient top down modulation of bottom up information
processing by frontal regions of the brain[6,7,8,9,10,11] and are
concurrent with the notion of enhanced short range but
diminished long range connectivity in the autistic brain
[10,11,12,13,14,15].
At the psychological level of analysis, the absent self theory also
proposes that self-awareness is less developed in ASC. When
individuals with ASC are asked to report on the content of
randomly sampled daily experiences, their reports relied on
physical descriptions of the moment rather than on their own
mental and emotional states[16]. During structured interviews that
elicit statements about various aspects of the self, adolescents with
ASC gave fewer descriptions of themselves in social contexts[17].
Adults with ASC may also not show the typical facilitative effect of
self-referential cognition on memory (the ‘‘self-reference effect in
memory’’)[18]. Individuals with ASC also report more difficulty
with identifying and describing their own emotions; what is known
clinically as ‘‘alexithymia’’[19]. Atypical first person pronoun
usage has also been well documented in ASC[1,20,21,22,23].
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echolalia[1] or to abnormalities in person deixis[22], normative
studies in social psychology regard first person pronoun usage as
an index of self-focused attention[24]. Thus, the available work
implicates that self-referential cognition may be abnormal in ASC.
In the present study we aimed to further examine whether self-
referential cognitive processing is abnormal in ASC and to
examine the interaction of self-referential cognition and empa-
thizing. First, we tested whether individuals with ASC would show
the typical self-reference effect in memory (SRE)[25]. Typically
developing adults show a robust SRE when self-referential
information processing is compared to information processing in
relation to other people or to semantic manipulations[26]. The
SRE is also positively related to trait self-consciousness[27] and
works through enhancing organizational and elaborative cognitive
processing of information[28,29]. To compliment the SRE para-
digm, we included several other well validated self-report and
performance measures of self-referential cognition. Furthermore,
since both cognitive and affective empathy impairments have been
well documented in ASC[30,31,32,33], several self-report and
performance measures of empathy were included. We predicted
that across all empathy and self-referential cognitive measures,
individuals with ASC would show concurrent impairments.
Within the typically developing brain, both self-referential
cognitive processing and mentalizing are consistently localized to
neural processing in cortical midline structures (CMS) of the brain
such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior
cingulate/precuneus (PC)[34,35,36,37,38,39] (see Figure 1). How-
ever, mentalizing does not selectively recruit CMS regions of the
brain in ASC[6,40,41,42,43]. This observation has led some to
theorize that CMS regions of the brain play a role in using
simulation as a mentalizing strategy[44,45]. Simulation theory
suggests that one way we know about the psychological
characteristics of others is by using information about ourselves
to construct a default model of how other minds work. To the
extent that someone is similar to oneself, one can then evaluate
how much of one’s own characteristics should be imputed onto
others[46,47,48]. Consistent with predictions made by simulation
theory, we predicted that individuals with ASC would show
decreased memory for themselves and for similar close others, but
show no differences in memory for a dissimilar non-close other or
for non-social information. Furthermore, to corroborate the link
between self-referential cognition and mentalizing we also
predicted that there would be significant individual differences in
how self-referential cognitive processing is related to mentalizing in
both ASC and normally developing controls.
METHODS
Participants
All participants gave informed consent to participate in this study
in accordance with the University of Cambridge Psychology
Research Ethics Committee. There were 23 males and 7 females
aged 19–45 that had an official diagnosis by internationally
accepted criteria[49,50] of either high-functioning autism (HFA;
n=4) or Asperger Syndrome (AS; n=26). Controls consisted of 23
males and 7 females who were pairwise matched on age and
gender and had no known psychiatric, developmental, or
neurological disorders. All participants completed the Autism
Spectrum Quotient (AQ)[51] and the ASC group scored higher
than controls on the AQ (p,0.001). All participants scored in the
normal range on the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI)[52] and there were no statistically significant group
differences on verbal, performance, or full scale IQ (all p.0.90).
See Table 1 for participant characteristics.
Procedure and Measures
SRE Paradigm The paradigm used to assess the SRE was
a depth-of-processing paradigm[53]. During the encoding phase,
participants judged trait adjectives in one of four ways. In the
‘‘self’’ condition, participants judged how descriptive the adjective
was of themselves. In the ‘‘similar close other’’ condition,
Figure 1. Image showing the overlap in peaks of activation from
studies of self-referential cognition, other-referential cognition, and
theory of mind within the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior
cingulate/precuneus. Boundaries are 16mm from within midline. All
peaks are taken from exemplary studies in the literature. Brain is
depicted on a representative sagittal slice of the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template (x=22).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.g001
Table 1. Participant characteristics and manipulation checks
on the SRE paradigm.
......................................................................
Control ASC t value p value Cohen’s d
Age 29.93 (7.83) 29.13 (7.40) 0.407 p=0.686 0.11
VIQ 116.47 (8.65) 116.13 (12.81) 0.118 p=0.906 0.03
PIQ 114.43 (10.08) 114.17 (14.21) 0.052 p=0.958 0.01
FIQ 117.10 (8.65) 117.23 (13.11) 20.047 p=0.963 0.01
AQ 16.50 (6.38) 33.93 (7.89) 29.408 p,0.001 2.47
Potter
Familiarity
4.53 (3.42) 3.70 (3.21) 0.973 p=0.334 0.25
Self-Friend
Similarity
4.13 (0.97) 4.13 (0.94) 0.000 p=1.000 0.00
Self-Potter
Similarity
2.63 (1.13) 2.23 (1.10) 1.387 p=0.171 0.36
Self-Friend
Closeness
4.80 (1.49) 4.70 (1.58) 0.252 p=0.802 0.07
Self-Potter
Closeness
2.70 (1.37) 2.13 (1.41) 1.581 p=0.119 0.42
Friend
Likeability
5.33 (0.61) 5.07 (1.17) 1.106 p=0.273 0.29
Potter
Likeability
4.07 (1.34) 4.23 (1.38) 20.475 p=0.637 0.12
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are shown along with
corresponding t values, p values, and effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for between group
comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.t001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 September 2007 | Issue 9 | e883adjectives were judged on how descriptive it was of their best
friend. In the ‘‘dissimilar non-close other’’ condition participants
judged whether the adjective was descriptive of Harry Potter[54].
All of these judgments were made on a 6 point scale where 1
indicated ‘‘not at all descriptive’’ and 6 indicated ‘‘very
descriptive’’. Finally, in the non-social control condition,
participants judged how many syllables each adjective contained
(from 1–6). Each condition had 30 trials and all were presented in
pseudorandom order. All adjectives were drawn from a previously
validated and widely used set of trait adjectives[55]. Half the
adjectives in each condition were positively valenced (e.g.,
inventive) while the other half were negatively valenced (e.g.,
messy). Among all conditions there were no differences in number
of characters, syllables, valence, or frequency of the adjectives.
After encoding there was a 30 minute delay before the retrieval
phase. Participants were completely unaware of the subsequent
recognition memory task to follow. During this delay participants
completed the performance section of the WASI. These tasks were
non-verbal and were administered to keep the participant
occupied during the delay period.
After the delay, participants were given a surprise recognition
memory test. All 120 adjectives from encoding and 120 new
distracter adjectives were presented in pseudorandom order.
Participants judged their confidence in whether the adjective
was ‘‘old’’ or ‘‘new’’. Confidence judgments were made on a 1–6
scale where 6 was ‘‘definitely OLD’’ and 4 was ‘‘OLD, but kind of
unsure’’. Conversely, a 1 indicated that they were ‘‘definitely
NEW’’ and a 3 was ‘‘NEW but kind of unsure’’. This 6 point scale
was used to force participants to make finer grained recognition
judgments and also to investigate whether there were any
differences in how each group used different confidence
judgments. There were no group differences among judgments
on each scale point within any of the conditions (all p.0.10).
Therefore, we collapsed judgments 1–3 into ‘‘New’’ and 4–6 into
‘‘Old’’ judgments.
Manipulation Checks Prior to testing, to ensure all
participants were familiar with Harry Potter we set an inclusion
criteriontohaveseenatleastoneHarryPotterfilmortohavereadat
least one book. We obtained a familiarity index for Harry Potter by
adding up the number of movies seen and books read. Groups did
not differ on this Harry Potter familiarity index (p=0.334).
After the SRE paradigm participants were asked how similar
and close they thought they were to their friend and to Harry
Potter and how likeable they perceived their friend or Harry Potter
to be. Similarity and likable judgments were rated on a 1–6 scale,
where 1 was ‘‘not at all’’ and 6 was ‘‘very much’’. For the closeness
measure, we used the Inclusion of Other in Self scale (IOS)[56].
The IOS depicts closeness spatially with Venn diagrams of two
circles. One circle is labeled ‘‘Self’’ and the other circle was either
labeled ‘‘Friend’’ or ‘‘Harry Potter’’. Participants are given 7
choices that vary in degree of overlap between the ‘‘Self’’ circle
and the other circle. Larger numbers indicate judgments of feeling
close and including another person within the self.
Confirming our similarity and closeness manipulations, within
each group participants viewed themselves and their best friend to
be closer and more similar than the Self-Harry Potter judgment.
Both groups also liked their friend more than Harry Potter (all
p,0.009). However, there were no differences between groups for
either best friend or Harry Potter on similarity, closeness, or liking
(all p.0.12). See Table 1.
Empathy Measures The Empathy Quotient (EQ)[57],
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)[58], and the Emotional
Contagion Scale (ECS)[59] were our three self-report measures
of empathy. The EQ was rescored into cognitive and affective
empathy based on items identified from previous factor
analyses[60]. On the IRI, our indices of cognitive and affective
empathy were the perspective taking and empathic concern
subscales respectively. The IRI also has two other subscales
(Fantasy and Personal Distress), but these were not included as
measures of cognitive or affective empathy. Finally, our
performance measure of empathy, indexing mentalizing ability,
was the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Eyes)[61].
Self-Consciousness/Awareness Measures Self-reported
self-consciousness/awareness was measured with the Private Self-
Consciousness Scale (PSCS)[62] and the Toronto Alexithymia
Scale (TAS)[63]. We also included a performance measure of self-
focused attention called the Self-Focus Sentence Completion
task[64]. In this task, participants were given sentence stems that
included a self-reference (e.g., I think…, If I had my way…). For
each stem, we asked participants to complete the sentence in
whatever way they liked. Self-focused attention (SFA) was the
dependent variable and was computed automatically with the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count program[65] as the
percentage of first person pronouns used to complete the
sentences (e.g., I, me, myself). This index has been used several
times as a valid quantitative index of SFA[66,67,68].
Statistical Analyses
To evaluate our main hypotheses within the SRE paradigm, we
ran a repeated measures ANOVA with four within subject levels
and group as the between subject variable. Our dependent
variable was a standard measure of memory sensitivity (d’)
formulated as the standardized score of correctly remembered
words minus the standardized score of false alarms. Because we
hypothesized that groups would differ on Eyes test performance
and because it was theoretically relevant to test the effects of the
SRE paradigm independent of mentalizing ability, we ran another
repeated measures ANCOVA with Eyes test included as
a covariate. Second, we computed two different SRE variables.
The first SRE was a difference score for self versus friend (d’ Self-d’
Friend) while the second SRE was the difference score for self
versus Harry Potter (d’ Self-d’ Harry Potter). Larger scores on
these SRE variables indicate larger biases for self-referentially
encoded information compared to other-referentially encoded
information. One sample t-tests in each group were ran to evaluate
whether each SRE variable was significantly different from 0.
Independent samples t-tests were also ran to determine whether
groups differed on the SRE variables. Third, we examined
whether groups differed on empathy and self-consciousness
measures using independent samples t-tests. Measures of effect
size (Cohen’s d) were also computed for each t-test comparison.
To examine individual differences between self-referential
cognition and mentalizing we ran multiple regression analyses
with Eyes test as the dependent variable and measures of self-
referential cognition (self memory, TAS, PSCS, SFA) as in-
dependent variables. In our regression models we determined
statistically whether relationships between mentalizing and self-
referential cognition differed as a function of diagnosis using
procedures outlined by Aiken and West[69]. In all, four regression
models were evaluated (one model for each self-referential
independent variable) and each model had the main effects of
the self independent variable and a dummy variable for group
entered on the first step. In the second step of our regression
model, we entered the product vector of the interaction between
the self independent variable and group membership (Group x Self
Independent Variable). If the product vector interaction term was
significant, this meant that the relationship between self-referential
cognition and mentalizing was statistically different between
Self, Empathy, and Autism
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 September 2007 | Issue 9 | e883groups (e.g., slopes were not parallel between groups). If this
occurred, we conducted a simple linear regression, but this time
separately on each group to discern how the relationships varied
by diagnosis. However, if the product vector was not significant,
this meant that there was no difference in the relationship between
self-referential cognition and mentalizing as a function of diagnosis
(e.g., slopes were parallel between groups). Therefore, in this case
we ran a simple linear regression model but this time with the data
Figure 2. Line graph depicting recognition memory performance (top) and self-referential biases in memory (bottom) during the SRE paradigm.
Bars indicate +/2 one SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.g002
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examine the relationship between self-referential cognition and the
AQ. In these analyses however, the AQ was the dependent
variable.
RESULTS
Our first analysis looked at performance on the SRE paradigm.
The repeated measures ANOVA showed an interaction effect
between encoding level and group (F(3,58)=3.599, p=0.015).
Therefore, we looked at the simple effects of encoding level within
and between groups to discern the basis of the interaction.
Consistent with our predictions, between group comparisons at
each level of encoding showed that individuals with ASC were not
impaired on memory for words previously judged on the basis of
counting syllables (t(58)=0.105, p=0.916, Cohen’s d=0.03) or
when judging Harry Potter’s personality (t(58)=0.716, p=0.450,
Cohen’s d=0.19). However, individuals with ASC had decreased
memory for words previously judged in relation to themselves
(t(58)=2.265, p=0.027, Cohen’s d=0.59) or their best friend
(t(58)=2.814, p=0.007, Cohen’s d=0.73). See Table 2 and
Figure 2.
Within each group there was a linear trend replicating the effect
of depth of processing within the SRE paradigm[26]. The
hierarchy of memory performance was Self.Friend.Potter.Syl-
lable. Post-hoc Bonferroni corrected comparisons confirmed that
all conditions for both groups were different from each other (all
p,0.02). Furthermore, within each group, SREs were greater
than zero for Self-Friend (Control: t(29)=3.175, p=0.004; ASC:
t(29)=4.068, p=0.0003) and for Self-Harry Potter (Control:
t(29)=7.768, p,0.001; ASC: t(29)=6.617, p,0.001). However,
between groups, the SRE for Self-Harry Potter was larger among
controls and approached statistical significance (t(58)=1.858,
p=0.068, Cohen’s d=0.49) while the SRE for Self-Friend was
not different between groups (t(58)=20.064, p=0.949, Cohen’s
d=0.02). See Table 2 and Figure 2.
When Eyes test was included as a covariate, the interaction
between group and encoding level approached statistical signifi-
cance (F(3,57)=2.471, p=0.064). Testing between group differ-
ences, we found only memory performance for the best friend
condition was different, with controls having better memory than
ASC (t(57)=2.001, p=0.05, Cohen’s d=0.53). Within each
group the hierarchy in memory performance still existed (Self.-
Friend.Other.Syllable; all p,0.02). The group difference for
the SRE of Self-Harry Potter approached statistical significance,
with controls having a large bias that ASC (t(57)=1.710,
p=0.093, Cohen’s d=0.45) while no differences remained for
the SRE of Self-Friend (t(57)=20.015, p=0.988, Cohen’s
d=0.003).
In our next analysis we examined whether there were
concurrent impairments in self-referential cognition and empathy
in ASC. Individuals with ASC scored lower across all empathy
measures (Cognitive EQ, Affective EQ, IRI Perspective Taking,
IRI Empathic Concern, ECS, Eyes test; all p,0.05). On the IRI
Fantasy subscale, individuals with ASC were also lower than
controls (t(58)=2.507, p=0.015, Cohen’s d=0.66). However, on
the IRI Personal Distress subscale, individuals with ASC scored
higher (t(58)=23.195, p=0.002, Cohen’s d=0.84). Individuals
with ASC showed no differences on the PSCS (t(58)=0.561,
p=0.577, Cohen’s d=0.15), but did report more alexithymia on
the TAS (t(58)=25.315, p,0.001, Cohen’s d=1.40). Among the
TAS subscales, individuals with ASC had more difficulty
identifying and describing their own feelings (DIF, DDF) and also
reported more externally oriented thinking (EOT) (all p,0.001).
Individuals with ASC were also lower in SFA on the Self-Focus
Sentence Completion test (t(58)=2.136, p=0.037, Cohen’s
d=0.56). See Table 3.
Next, we examined whether individual differences in self-
referential cognition were related to mentalizing ability. No
differences existed between groups in the relationship between
Eyes test and self memory performance or TAS (indicated by
a non-significant Group x Self interaction term in the regression
model). Thus, since slopes were similar across groups, we collapsed
the data across groups and looked at the effect of self-referential
cognition on mentalizing. We found that regardless of diagnosis,
self memory performance was positively related to Eyes test
performance (r=0.34, p=0.007). Alexithymia was also negatively
related to Eyes test performance (r=20.43 p,0.001). Private self-
consciousness and self focused attention however, showed
differential relationships with the Eyes test that were dependent
upon diagnosis. There was a significant interaction effect between
how PSCS and diagnosis predicted Eyes performance (F
change(1,56)=4.917, p=0.031). Inspecting the relationship PSCS
had with the Eyes test separately within each group revealed that
Table 2. SRE paradigm data.
......................................................................
Control ASC t value p value Cohen’s d
Self 1.68 (0.51) 1.38 (0.51) 2.265 p=0.027 0.59
Friend 1.44 (0.40) 1.14 (0.43) 2.814 p=0.007 0.73
Potter 1.02 (0.49) 0.93 (0.47) 0.761 p=0.450 0.19
Syllable 0.62 (0.42) 0.61 (0.44) 0.105 p=0.916 0.03
SRE (Self-Friend) 0.23 (0.40) 0.24 (0.32) 20.064 p=0.949 0.02
SRE (Self-Potter) 0.66 (0.46) 0.45 (0.38) 1.858 p=0.068 0.49
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for d’ measures along with t
values, p values, and effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for between group comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.t002
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Table 3. Empathy and self-consciousness/awareness data.
......................................................................
Control ASC t value p value Cohen’s d
IRI EC 18.93 (5.16) 15.83 (6.09) 2.127 p=0.038 0.56
IRI PT 18.50 (5.30) 14.33 (5.49) 2.991 p=0.004 0.79
IRI FS 17.77 (5.69) 13.87 (6.34) 2.507 p=0.015 0.66
IRI PD 10.60 (4.00) 14.53 (5.42) 23.195 p=0.002 0.84
ECS 41.97 (7.99) 37.47 (8.16) 2.158 p=0.035 0.57
Cognitive EQ 15.27 (5.25) 4.17 (3.81) 9.381 p,0.001 2.46
Affective EQ 14.47 (6.30) 5.87 (3.83) 6.388 p,0.001 1.68
Eyes Test 27.03 (3.90) 23.73 (6.67) 2.340 p=0.023 0.61
PSCS 30.50 (4.16) 29.80 (5.42) 0.561 p=0.577 0.15
TAS 41.97 (9.19) 58.37 (14.19) 25.315 p,0.001 1.40
DIF 13.50 (4.82) 20.03 (6.70) 24.337 p,0.001 1.14
DDF 11.10 (4.85) 16.87 (5.62) 24.252 p,0.001 1.12
EOT 17.37 (4.16) 21.47 (4.90) 23.493 p,0.001 0.92
SFA 0.11 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 2.136 p=0.037 0.56
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) along with t values, p values,
and effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for between group comparisons. EC, Empathic
Concern; PT, Perspective Taking; FS, Fantasy; PD, Personal Distress; ECS,
Emotional Contagion Scale; EQ, Empathy Quotient; PSCS, Private Self-
Consciousness; TAS, Toronto Alexithymia Scale; DIF, Difficulty Identifying
Feelings; DDF, Difficulty Describing Feelings; EOT, Externally Oriented Thinking;
SFA, self-focused attention.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.t003
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 September 2007 | Issue 9 | e883the interaction effect was driven by a strong positive correlation
between PSCS and Eyes test performance in individuals with ASC
(r=0.50, p=0.005) but not controls (r=20.01, p=0.951).
Regarding the relationship that SFA had with Eyes test
performance, we found another significant interaction effect
between SFA and diagnosis (F change (1,56)=6.627, p=0.013).
Upon looking at the relationship between SFA and Eyes test
performance separately for each group, we found the interaction
effect was driven by a negative relationship between SFA and Eyes
test performance in the control group while individuals with ASC
showed a positive relationship between SFA and the Eyes test.
Both of these correlations approached statistical significance
(Controls: r=20.32, p=0.08; ASC: r=0.35, p=0.06). See
Figures 3–6.
In similar analyses, we looked at how self-referential cognition
predicts scores on the AQ. There was no interaction effect among
group and self-memory, TAS, or PSCS. Therefore, after collapsing
across groups we found that increasing TAS scores predicted more
autistic traits (r=0.63, p,0.001) and that increasing self memory
predicted less autistic traits (r=20.32 p=0.01). There was no
relationship between PSCS and AQ scores. When modeling the
relationship between SFA and AQ scores, there was a significant
interaction effect between SFA and diagnosis (F change
(1,56)=12.38, p,0.001). Thus, we looked at the relationship of
SFA on AQ scores separately for each group. Among controls,
higher SFA predicts higher AQ scores (r=0.50, p=0.005). The
opposite is true for individuals with ASC; higher SFA predicts lower
AQ scores (r=20.37, p,0.05). See Figures 3–6.
Figure 3. Scatterplots depicting the relationship between self memory and Eyes test (top) or AQ scores (bottom).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.g003
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This study confirmed through multiple measures that individuals
with ASC have difficulties in the self-referential cognitive domain.
In the SRE paradigm, individuals with ASC show the typical SRE
but to a reduced extent compared to age and IQ matched
controls. People with ASC also showed reduced memory for
themselves and for a similar close other but did not show any
memory impairments for a dissimilar non-close other or for non-
social memory. Thus, the only group differences in memory
occurred for conditions where self information was to be
remembered, or for information about others who significantly
overlap with the self; similar close others.
Individuals with ASC are not however, completely impaired in
self-referential information processing. We did not replicate the
findings from the Toichi et al., study[18]. Unlike the Toichi study,
which claimed that there was no SRE in ASC, we did find
significant SREs in the ASC group. The differences in our study
and the Toichi study are worth mentioning because they shed light
on the differing findings. First, the Toichi study used a biased
measure of memory performance in the percentage of words that
were correctly recognized. We used a more unbiased measure of
memory sensitivity (d’) that corrects for the false alarm rate.
Second, unlike the Toichi study, we included comparison
conditions for thinking about other people. When self memory is
compared to memory for others, both the control and ASC groups
showed the typical SRE. SREs for self versus a similar close other
are identical among the two groups. Given that there are SRE
effects within the ASC group, it cannot be the case that people
with ASC are not facilitated by self information.
Figure 4. Scatterplots depicting the relationship between alexithymia and Eyes test (top) or AQ scores (bottom).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.g004
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the self. Several investigators have found effects supporting this
hypothesized overlap and that the neural substrate involved in this
processing may be MPFC[37,44,45,48,56,70]. Thus, our compar-
ison of an SRE between self and best friend may not be the best
measure of a pure SRE. In fact, the self and best friend overlap
quite a bit within our manipulation checks of closeness and
similarity. Our best comparison of whether individuals really do
exhibit a bias for self information is the SRE for self versus
a dissimilar non-close other. When this comparison was in-
vestigated, individuals with ASC did show a trend for having
smaller SREs than controls. This result brings up the idea that the
impairment in using self information in ASC is one of degree and
not complete absence. Further work at the neural level will be able to
tell us more about the degree of impairment and the extent to
which self- and other-referential cognitive processing overlap in
the brains of people with ASC.
Our findings on several other measures of self-referential
cognition also highlight its importance in ASC. Individuals with
ASC report more alexithymia and are less self-focused but do not
differ in private self-consciousness. Our findings extend on past
work[16,19] and show that deficits in self-referential cognition are
not simply because of differences in the amount of self-reflection
they engage in (as indexed by no group differences in PSCS and
intact SREs), but has more to do with the ease of knowing about
one’s own inner emotional life. We mirror the conclusions of
Figure 5. Scatterplots depicting the relationship between self-focused attention and Eyes test (top) and AQ scores (bottom). The index of self-
focused attention is the percentage of first person pronouns used on the Self-Focus Sentence Completion test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.g005
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monitor their own inner states to some degree. However, it
remains unclear what is the direction of the relationship between
their known difficulties in understanding their own emotions and
their attentional biases and future research should be directed at
parsing apart this question.
We also showed in several ways that self-referential cognition
and empathy are inextricably linked. First, our results within the
SRE paradigm showed that mentalizing accounted specifically for
self memory (indicated by the lack of a group difference in self
memory after the Eyes test was included as a covariate) but not for
memory in other-referential or non-social encoding conditions.
Furthermore, some individual differences in self-referential
cognition were related to mentalizing, regardless of whether an
individual had a diagnosis. As self memory increased, mentalizing
also increased and the endorsement of autistic traits decreased.
The same pattern of individual differences (regardless of diagnosis)
was manifest in the relationship between alexithymia and
mentalizing. Here, more alexithymia is related to worse mentaliz-
ing and more endorsement of autistic traits.
Although we found some individual differences in self-
referential cognition and mentalizing that were independent of
diagnosis, we also found some very interesting and important
relationships between self-referential cognition and mentalizing
that depend upon diagnosis. In particular, self-focused attention
and mentalizing were differentially related depending on di-
agnosis. ASC individuals who are more self-focused are better at
mentalizing. However, among controls, being more self-focused
predicted less mentalizing ability. A similar pattern existed with
self-focused attention and endorsement of autistic traits. ASC
individuals who are more self-focused report having less autistic
traits. Among controls, those who are more self-focused report
having more autistic traits. Another measure that showed
a differential relationship based on diagnosis was the private self-
consciousness scale. In the social psychological literature, private
self-consciousness is believed to be a reflective form of self-focused
attention[24] and is a good compliment to our performance
measure of self-focused attention (the Self-Focus Sentence
Completion task), which was more implicit and non-reflective in
nature. On this measure of more reflective self-focused attention,
a similar pattern emerged to that of implicit non-reflective self-
focused attention. ASC individuals who report being higher in
private self-consciousness are better at mentalizing. However,
among controls private self-consciousness was not related to
mentalizing. Because these results are correlational it is hard to
tease apart why these relationships exist and further manipulations
of self-focused attention will be needed to understand the
mechanisms underlying these relationships. However, one finding
is clear: being more self-focused appears to be beneficial for
individuals with ASC. For now, we speculatively conclude that
these findings might point to the idea that people with autism need
to be more self-focused and have more metacognitive ability to
accurately reflect on themselves in order to mentalize with others.
If this is true, it would support the idea that simulation is a strategy
that individuals with ASC could benefit from and may be helpful
in informing novel treatments for more able high-functioning
individuals on the autism spectrum.
Overall, our results implicate dysfunction within CMS regions
of the brain in ASC. The concurrent impairments and relation-
ships observed for both self-referential cognition and empathy are
striking given that CMS regions are consistently recruited for both
thinking about the psychological characteristics of oneself or
others[34] and when engaging in the exact same paradigm we
employed in this study; the ‘‘SRE levels-of-processing para-
digm’’[35,36,37]. However, within ASC, recent evidence points
towards disruption of CMS function when mentaliz-
ing[6,40,41,42,43] and during rest[72]. The idea that CMS
dysfunction is important in ASC is also corroborated by studies in
Figure 6. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between self-focused attention and Eyes test performance. The index of self-focused attention is
a reflective form of self-focused attention as measured by the Private Self-Consciousness Scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883.g006
Self, Empathy, and Autism
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2007 | Issue 9 | e883individuals with high levels of alexithymia. Moriguchi and
colleagues[73] found similar behavioral results to our study, in
that individuals with high levels of alexithymia are also impaired at
mentalizing. Individuals with high levels of alexithymia also
exhibited a similar pattern of reduced activation in CMS regions
that were previously found using the same mentalizing task in
ASC[43]. Thus, our study converges on the idea that CMS
dysfunction is paramount to the social and self-referential
impairments in ASC. Future work investigating the developmental
trajectory of CMS structural and functional organization in the
brain is needed. Furthermore, future investigation on the
development of self-referential cognition and its causal relationship
with empathy may prove fruitful for informing our understanding
of the neurodevelopment of ASC.
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